Erich Von Manstein Lost Victories translation of Lost Victories. 9 Favorites. DOWNLOAD OPTIONS. download 1 file · ABBYY GZ download. Erich von Manstein, whether deliberately or unconsciously, has illuminated the That is what Field Marshal von Manstein suggests in his title, Lost Victories. Erich Von Manstein Lost Victories PDF - Free download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online for free. Erich-von-manstein-lost-victories-pdf.
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Review Essay Work Reviewed: von Manstein, Erich. Lost Victories. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, Course: Strategy & Policy Instructor: Professor. Verlorene Siege is the personal narrative of Erich von Manstein, a German field marshal during . Create a book · Download as PDF · Printable version. Editorial Reviews. Review. Wall Street Journal, October 7, "Generals don't make the best Download it once and read it on your site device, PC, phones or tablets. Erich Von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategistsite Edition.
Just as Manstein arrived, however, the Soviets launched a series of large counterattacks which Manstein fended off, but which prevented the Germans from mounting their own assault on the city. Manstein writes about this in a page chapter. As a result of the foolish attempt to take the major city of Stalingrad and drive into the Caucasus to take the oil fields there, the Germans in the south were badly overextended, and forced to rely on the sub-standard armies of their allies the Italians, Rumanians, and Hungarians.
In November the Soviets launched a major offensive which cut off the entire 6th Army at Stalingrad, and destroyed two Rumanian armies. Hitler sent Manstein south, hoping he could find a way to salvage the situation for the Germans.
Long story short: he was never able to stop the Soviets or regain German initiative in the south except for the brief offensive at Kursk , but he did, on numerous occasions, keep the Soviets from penetrating and surrounding the entire southern wing of the German army, which could have shortened the war by a year or even two. Manstein displayed operational brilliance on many occasions, but he was continually hamstrung by Hitler's "to the last man" directives, his parsimonious supply of reinforcements and replacements, and his refusal to make decisions on a timely basis.
Manstein describes his interactions with Hitler, and analyzes Hitler's weaknesses as a military commander, in some depth on several occasions in the last few hundred pages of the book.
Lost Victories ends rather abruptly with Manstein's account of how he was unceremoniously transferred by Hitler from command of Army Group South to a "reserve" position back in Germany, a result of their repeated head-butting and Hitler's perception that Manstein was publicly questioning Hitler's ability to command.
He does not describe how he finished the war, or how he escaped the frequently fatal chaos of the final days of the Reich. Manstein was a proud German officer of the Prussian tradition, which led to repeated contretemps with Hitler over how the war in the East should be conducted.
In this book he doesn't pass much judgement on Hitler's choices of strategic objectives, and he recognizes that some objectives had political or economic significance that a purely military planner would have ignored.
But he wanted Hitler and the OKW to give him the independence due an army group commander to figure out how to achieve objectives in his own way. His biggest problem was Hitler's insistence on holding every inch of ground captured, which placed too great a burden on the Germans' over-extended and exhausted troops.
As Manstein notes, such an approach ignores the ancient military dictum that "he who defends everything ends up holding nothing.
Manstein also doesn't mention his part in the postwar Nuremburg trials, in which he was tried for turning a blind eye to the activities of the Einsatzgruppen who followed in the wake of his armies, murdering Jews and other declared enemies of the Nazi state. Accounts of the trial, the case against Manstein, and his defense are readily available online. The things Manstein leaves out of Lost Victories are as important as the things he discusses, and lead one to search out other sources to fill in the lacunae.
This perception that Manstein was covering for himself in this memoir are strengthened by the fact that this edition is a heavily edited version of the original, with many personal anecdotes excised, and the entire chapter on Operation Citadel Kursk has been replaced entirely with an article Manstein wrote for the Marine Corps Gazette, which I found wholly disappointing.
On the plus side, the book includes many very useful maps that cover the entirety the text.
Even if they are sometimes cluttered, they are very well drawn and virtually all place names included in the narrative can be found on at least one map, making it very easy to follow the sometimes swirling action. Speaking of that, special kudos to the translator, Anthony Powell, who has taken sometimes convoluted German syntax I speak from experience and given Manstein a consistently erudite, dignified, and sometimes sardonic voice in English.
Powell rated it really liked it I was engrossed by this book of Erich von Manstein. I had heard of the German tank commander from reading other historical accounts of things during WWII. Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten.
Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt , Giordano, Ralph. Die zweite Schuld, oder Von der Last Deutscher zu sein. Shy, John. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Turabian, L. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, On War.
Princeton : Princeton University Press, Erich von Manstein: Vernichtungskrieg und Geschichtspolitik. Essay by Sebastian Dannhoff sdannho1 jhu.His biggest problem was Hitler's insistence on holding every inch of ground captured, which placed too great a burden on the Germans' over-extended and exhausted troops.
Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General [Illustrated Edition]
As a result of the foolish attempt to take the major city of Stalingrad and drive into the Caucasus to take the oil fields there, the Germans in the south were badly overextended, and forced to rely on the sub-standard armies of their allies the Italians, Rumanians, and Hungarians. After that, he put considerable energy into devising a plan for the invasion of France--and just as much energy getting someone at the highest echelons of the Wehrmacht to notice his plan.
Even if they are sometimes cluttered, they are very well drawn and virtually all place names included in the narrative can be found on at least one map, making it very easy to follow the sometimes swirling action.
As proof of this claim, he adduces the sweeping victory in Order White2, as well as the successful capturing of the Crimean Peninsula by the 11th Army3. As Manstein notes, such an approach ignores the ancient military dictum that "he who defends everything ends up holding nothing.